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THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RENTAL
HOUSING ACT: EVICTION PROTECTION FOR
THE TENANTS OF A DEFAULTING
MORTGAGOR UNDER ADMINISTRATOR OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS v. VALENTINE
The District of Columbia Rental Housing Act of 1985 (D.C. Rental Housing Act of 1985)' represents an ongoing legislative attempt to stabilize residential rents and alleviate the severe rental housing shortage that exists in

the District of Columbia.2 Eviction controls play an integral role in this
remedial legislation because, as the United States Supreme Court has noted,3

the success of any legislative attempt to limit a landlord's demands for rent is
dependent upon the landlord's freedom to evict tenants.4 The current Dis-

trict of Columbia eviction restrictions severely limit a landlord's ability to
evict tenants by enumerating nine permissible grounds upon which a landlord can recover possession of rental property.5
In Administratorof Veterans Affairs v.Valentine,6 the District of Colum-

bia Court of Appeals expanded the protection afforded to tenants by these
statutory eviction restrictions. 7 The Valentine court held that the eviction

restrictions enumerated in section 45-1561 of the District of Columbia
Rental Housing Act of 1980 (D.C. Rental Housing Act)' applied to new
1. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2501 to -2594 (1986). The District of Columbia Rental Housing Act of 1985 became effective on July 17, 1985 following the expiration of the District of
Columbia Rental Housing Act of 1980. The 1985 Act will remain in effect until December 31,
1991.
2. See D.C. Rental Housing Emergency Act of 1985, D.C. CODE ANN., §§ 45-2501 to 2502 (1986).
3. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (upholding the constitutionality of rent and eviction control legislation in the District of Columbia).
4. Id. at 157-58.
5. See infra note 26.
6. 490 A.2d 1165 (D.C. 1985). Following the Valentine decision, the term "landlord"
was replaced by "housing provider" in the D.C. Rental Housing Act of 1985, D.C. CODE
ANN. § 45-2503(15) (1986). A "housing provider" is defined as "a landlord, an owner, lessor,
sublessor, assignee, or their agent, or any other person receiving or entitled to receive rents or
benefits for the use or occupancy of any rental unit within a housing accommodation within
the District."
7. 490 A.2d at 1165.
8. Valentine was decided six days prior to the expiration of the District of Columbia
Rental Housing Act of 1980. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-1501 to -1597 (1981 & Supp. 1985). All
sections of the 1980 Act pertinent to this Note were retained by the D.C. Rental Housing Act
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owners of rental property purchased at a foreclosure sale.9 As a result, a
new owner may only evict the tenants of a defaulting mortgagor for one of
the nine permissible reasons enumerated in the D.C. Rental Housing Act.
Although the decision applies to any and all new owners of District rental
property, it has had an especially direct and immediate impact on District of
Columbia banks and lending institutions.'o In the event of a foreclosure, the
majority's opinion deprives these institutions of clear title to property and

compels them to become the equivalent of unwilling landlords."'
In 1977, Joyce Valentine executed a one-year lease on an apartment in a
four-unit building located in the southeast section of the District of Columbia. 2 In 1982, the owner defaulted on the mortgage payments, and the
lender instituted foreclosure proceedings. After purchasing the property at
public auction, the lender conveyed title to the Veteran's Administration
(VA), which had insured the mortgage.' 3
Later that year, Ms. Valentine receive a notice to quit from the VA, instructing her to vacate the property within thirty days.' 4 She failed to leave
the premises, and the VA filed a complaint for possession of real estate in
District of Columbia Superior Court. In granting Valentine's motion to dismiss the complaint, the trial court held that the VA had failed to allege any

of the permissible reasons for eviction delineated in section 45-1561 of the
D.C. Rental Housing Act.' 5

In affirming the decision below, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that tenants remaining in possession of rental property following a
of 1985. See supra note 1. However, this Note will refer to the expired legislation in order to
be consistent with the decision.
9. 490 A.2d at 1166. The Valentine holding has been applied by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in two subsequent decisions. See Merriweather v. District of Columbia
Bldg. Corp., 494 A.2d 1276 (D.C. 1985); Washington Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. District of
Columbia Rental Hous. Comm'n, 492 A.2d 279 (D.C. 1985).
10. Two months after Valentine was decided, a Maryland lending institution with an annual lending rate of $25-30 million stopped making mortgage loans in the District of Columbia. According to the board chairman, the decision "takes from us retroactively a portion of
the value of the property we thought we had going in." See Court Rulings on D.C Evictions
Worry Lenders, Wash. Post, June 22, 1985, at Bl, col. 3. As of January 1986, the lending
institution's decision had remained unchanged. Telephone interview with Charles A. Dukes,
Jr., Board Chairman of John Hanson Savings and Loan, Inc. (Jan. 2, 1986).
11. Id. See also Valentine, 490 A.2d at 1172 (Terry, J., dissenting).
12. Valentine, 490 A.2d at 1166. Upon expiration of the lease, Ms. Valentine retained
possession of the premises and paid rent to successive owners of the property.
13. Id.
14. Id. The letter stated that "[i]t is necessary that we obtain possession of this property
immediately in order that we may take steps to dispose of the property with the least delay."

Id.
15. Administrator of Veterans Affairs v. Valentine, No. LT-86368-82 (D.C. Super. Ct.
Jan. 28, 1983) (Bacon, J., presiding). See infra note 26.
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foreclosure sale are protected by the District of Columbia statutory eviction
restrictions. 16 In a two-to-one per curiam decision, 7 the majority construed
the D.C. Rental Housing Act's definition of "landlord" to include any purchaser of rental property following foreclosure, including the VA.' 8 Furthermore, the court stated that the eviction restrictions of section 45-1561

superseded earlier enacted statutes that define the tenants of a defaulting
mortgagor as tenants at will following foreclosure proceedings. 19 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Terry stated that the majority's decision implicitly
repealed sections 45-222 and 45-1403 of the District of Columbia Code
(D.C. Code), and was therefore contrary to established principles of statutory construction. 20 The dissent contended that the earlier statutes were an
exception to and qualification of the D.C. Rental Housing Act of 1980.21
This Note will trace and compare the legislative histories of the District of
Columbia statutes defining a tenancy at will and the District of Columbia
rent and eviction control legislation. It will contrast tenancies at will with
tenancies created by the D.C. Rental Housing Act, and analyze the judicial
resolution of the apparent conflict between these two statutory definitions.
This Note will then evaluate the Valentine court's decision to supersede earlier conflicting legislation in order to provide a defaulting mortgagor's tenants with District of Columbia statutory eviction protections following a
foreclosure sale. This Note will conclude with a discussion of the liberal
interpretation afforded rent and eviction control legislation.
I. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA STATUTORY EVICTION
RESTRICTIONS AND TENANCIES AT WILL: A COMPARISON
OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES
Section 45-222 of the D.C. Code defines a "tenant at will" to include both
a mortgagor of property and "those in possession claiming under him" when
the property is sold and subsequently conveyed to its purchaser.2 2 For in16.
17.
Mack.
18.
19.
20.
(1986).
21.
22.

Valentine, 490 A.2d at 1166.
The Valentine decision was rendered by Judges James A. Belson and Julia Cooper
Judge John A. Terry filed the dissenting opinion.
Id. at 1169-70. See infra notes 93-105 and accompanying text.
490 A.2d at 1170. See infra notes 106-118 and accompanying text.
490 A.2d at 1170-71 (Terry, J., dissenting). See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-222, 45-1403

490 A.2d at 1171-72 (Terry, J., dissenting).
D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-222 (1986) provides that
An estate at will is one held by the joint will of lessor and lessee, and which may be
terminated at any time, as herein elsewhere provided, by either party; and such estate
shall not exist or be created except by express contract: Provided, however, that in
case of a sale of real estate under mortgage or deed of trust or execution, and a
conveyance thereof to the purchaser, the grantor in such mortgage or deed of trust,
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stance, a defaulting mortgagor becomes a tenant at will of the mortgagee or
any purchaser of property after foreclosure. This type of tenancy may be
23
terminated with thirty days written notice.
In contrast, "tenant" is defined by the D.C. Rental Housing Act of 1980
as "a tenant, subtenant, lessee, sublessee, or other person entitled to the possession, occupancy, or the benefits thereof of any rental unit owned by another person." 24 These tenants are protected by the eviction restrictions
delineated in section 45-1561,2 and may only be evicted by a landlord under
one of nine statutory exceptions. 26 As neither default nor foreclosure of a
mortgage is listed as a permissible reason for eviction, a statutory conflict
with section 45-222 initially appears to exist. However, a closer examination
of the legislative history and judicial interpretation of both statutes reveals
no inconsistency.
A.

The Origin and Purpose of Districtof Columbia Code Section 45-222:
Tenancies at Will

Prior to 1901, District of Columbia law permitted an estate at will to exist
or be created only by express contract between a lessor and lessee. 27 Congress amended the law in 1901 in order to permit a tenancy at will to exist
between a mortgagor of property or his tenants and the subsequent owner of
execution defendant, or those in possession claiming under him, shall be held and
construed to be tenants at will, except in the case of a tenant holding under an
unexpired lease for years, in writing, antedating the mortgage or deed of trust.
23. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1403 (1986).
24. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1503(30) (1981) (replaced by D.C. Rental Housing Act of
1985, D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-2503(36) (1986)).
25. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1561(a) to (j)
(1981). See supra note 8.
26. The permissible reasons for eviction are: (1) violation of an obligation of a tenancy;
(2) performance of an illegal act on the premises; (3) immediate and personal use by the landlord; 4) existence of a written contract to sell the premises for the immediate and personal use
by another person; (5) necessary alteration or renovation of the premises; (6) immediate demolition and replacement of the premises; (7) immediate and substantial rehabilitation of the
premises; (8) immediate discontinuation of use of the premises as housing; and (9) conversion
of the premises to a condominium or cooperative. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1561(a) to (j)
(replaced by D.C. Rental Housing Act of 1985, D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-2551(a) to (j) (1986)).
The landlord must comply fully with the statute's procedures for eviction even when evicting a tenant for one of the above reasons. For example, before a landlord may lawfully evict a
tenant in order to sell rental property, the landlord must first notify the tenant in writing and
provide the tenant with an option to purchase the property. If the tenant chooses not to exercise the option, the landlord may recover possession of the rental property only if a written sale
agreement exists for the immediate and personal use and occupancy by another person. Furthermore, the tenant must first be served with a 90 day notice to vacate. D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 4 5-1561(e) (replaced by D.C. Rental Housing Act of 1985, D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-2551(e)

(1986)).
27. Act of July 4, 1864, ch. 243, 13 Stat. 383.
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the property after it is sold. 28 This legislative decision to expand the statutory definition of a tenancy at will was directly related to the development of
the District of Columbia summary eviction proceedings.29
In Willis v. Eastern Trust and Banking Co.,3" the United States Supreme
Court held that a summary process to recover possession of land in the District of Columbia could not be maintained against a mortgagor by the mortgagee of a defaulted mortgage or deed of trust.3 The Court stated that the
existing unlawful detainer statute was available only when a conventional
landlord/tenant relationship had existed between the parties at some point.3 2
The District of Columbia unlawful detainer statute construed by the Willis Court permitted a "person entitled to the premises" to evict summarily
any person who detained possession of property without right after the expiration of a lease or a notice to quit.3 3 Because a mortgagor was not considered to be a tenant of the mortgagee, the Court held that a mortgagee was
not a "person entitled" to the summary eviction procedure.3 4 Instead, the
mortgagee was limited to the traditional action of ejectment. 35
In direct response to the Willis decision, Congress amended the unlawful
detainer statute in 1901 in order to afford the summary proceedings to any
"person aggrieved" by an unlawful detention of property. 36 The amended
statute also expressly provided for the summary eviction of a defaulting
28. Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 854, § 1036, 31 Stat. 1352. Mortgagors and those claiming

under them were included in the statute by the addition of a proviso to the rule that tenancies
at will could not exist or be created except by express contract. The statute, which is currently
codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-222 (1986), has remained unchanged since the 1901
amendment.
29. See infra notes 30-43 and accompanying text.
30. 169 U.S. 295 (1898).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 309.
33. See D.C. REV. STAT. ch. 19, § 684 (1873) (reenacting Act of July 4, 1864, ch. 243, 13
Stat. 383).
34. Willis, 169 U.S. at 310-11. The Willis Court held that the unlawful detainer statute
"was clearly designed to afford a speedy remedy where the conventional relation of landlord
and tenant existed, and not where the relation is created by operation of law." Id. at 303.
35. Id. at 311. The common law action of ejectment is a slow, complicated and costly
method of trying title to land. 2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY

§ 250(3)

(1983). Statutory

modifications of the common law ejectment proceedings exist in every state and the District of
Columbia. Id. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1101 to -1124 (1981 & Supp. 1985); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 45-1410 (1986). However, the District of Columbia summary eviction proceedings
provide an alternative to ejectment to any "person aggrieved" by an unlawful detention of
property. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1501 to -1505 (1981); see generally R. POWELL, supra, at
§ 250(3). Rather than resolving a question of title, the summary proceedings "permit an expeditious judicial determination" of the right to possession. Tutt v. Doby, 459 F.2d 1195, 1198
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
36. Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 854, § 20, 31 Stat. 1193.
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mortgagor or any person claiming under him. 3 Therefore, the amended
unlawful detainer statute was no longer limited to use by landlords, and represented "a summary procedure designed to mete out prompt justice in possessory disputes.
The statutory definition of a tenancy at will was also amended following
the Willis decision to include mortgagors and their tenants after property is
sold and conveyed to a subsequent purchaser. 39 The amended statute, currently codified at D.C. Code section 45-222, represented an act of legislative
fairness. In permitting the summary eviction procedure to be maintained
against a mortgagor,
Congress did not intend a remedy too expeditious to be fair, and
recognized the justice of giving a former owner of real estate, or his
tenant, when sold out under a mortgage or deed of trust, a reasonable notice and time to peaceably remove himself and his belongings from the property sold before being made a defendant in a
summary proceeding in court.'
Therefore, because a defaulting mortgagor or his tenants were considered to
be in unlawful possession of property following its sale,4 1 Congress afforded
them notice of impending eviction proceedings by including them in the statutory definition of a tenant at will. The inclusion was in the form of a proviso that acknowledged the absence of a contractual relationship between a
mortgagor or those under him and a mortgagee or subsequent purchaser of
property.4 2
Prior to Willis, tenants subject to eviction by their landlords under the
unlawful detainer statute were afforded notice of the impending proceedings.
The purpose of section 45-222 is to provide a mortgagor or those under him
with the same notice from a mortgagee or a subsequent purchaser following
foreclosure despite the absence of a contractual landlord/tenant
37. Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 854, § 20, 31 Stat. 1193.
38. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 372 (1974). In addition to unlawful deten-

tion of property, the statute permitted summary eviction for forcible entry and forcible detainer. See Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 854, § 20, 31 Stat. 1193. In 1953, Congress amended the
1901 Act, and placed the unlawful detainer provisions in a separate statute. See D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-1501 to -1505 (1981) (current D.C. unlawful detainer provisions); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 22-3101 (1981) (current D.C. forcible entry and detainer provisions). The separation
of these provisions is not evident from the D.C. Code, as Congress has never amended the title
of the unlawful detainer chapter. Therefore, the District of Columbia unlawful detainer statute, currently codified at §§ 16-1501 to -1505, is still entitled "Forcible Entry and Detainer."
For a detailed history of § 16-1501, see generally Pernell, 416 U.S. at 376-81.
39. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
40. Thornhill v. Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 70 F.2d 846, 847 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
41. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
42. See supra note 28.
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relationship.4 3
B.

The Origin and Purpose of the Districtof Columbia Eviction
Restrictions: Section 45-1561

In 1921, the United States Supreme Court in Block v. Hirsh" declared
District of Columbia rent and eviction control legislation constitutional.
Since that decision, District of Columbia rent control laws and concomitant
eviction restrictions have been enacted at various times,4 5 and this form of
legislation has been in effect in the District continuously since 1973.46
In the Block decision, the Supreme Court noted its deference to the District of Columbia Rent Control Commission's (D.C. Rent Control Commission) decision to establish eviction restrictions.4 7 The Court stated that the
restrictions served the stated congressional objective of stabilizing the District of Columbia rental housing market.48 The restrictions evaluated by the
Court were similar to those currently in effect in the District, and the language used in section 45-1561 of the D.C. Rental Housing Act of 1980 has
been substantially the same since 1973. 49
The current District of Columbia statutory eviction restrictions were enacted as an essential part of the 1980 Act. This Act represented a legislative
response to a severe rental housing shortage, increasing rental costs, and the
rapid conversion of rental units to other uses.5" Section 45-1561 of the 1980
Act states that as long as rent is paid, a tenant may lawfully remain in possession of rental property following the expiration of a lease or rental agree43. See Thornhill, 70 F.2d at 847 (stating that Congress intended to provide landlords
with an expeditious statutory substitute for ejectment only if and when a tenant was given
notice). The legislative creation of a tenancy at will between a mortgagor and a mortgagee or
subsequent purchaser of property provides the mortgagor with thirty days notice of impending
eviction proceedings. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1403 (1986).
44. 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
45. See, e.g., D.C. Emergency Rent Act, Act of Dec. 2, 1941, ch. 553, §§ 1-11, 55 Stat.
788 (repealed 1953).
46. See D.C. Rental Housing Act of 1985, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2501 to -2594 (1986);
D.C. Rental Housing Act of 1980, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-1501 to -1597 (1981 & Supp. 1985)
(expired 1985); D.C. Rental Housing Act of 1977, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-1681 to -1699.27
(Supp. VII 1979) (repealed 1980); D.C. Rental Accommodations Act of 1975, D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 45-1631 to -1674 (Supp. V 1978) (repealed 1977); D.C. Rental Housing Act of 1973,
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-1621 to -1627 (Supp. 1974) (repealed 1975).
47. 256 U.S. at 154. Congress established the D.C. Rental Housing Commission to enforce rent and eviction controls made necessary by World War I. The War created rental
conditions in the District that were dangerous to the public health and safety. Id.
48. Id. at 157-58. See Act of Oct. 22, 1919, ch. 80, tit. II, § 122, 41 Stat. 297, 304 (repealed 1921).
49. See supra note 46.
50. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1501 (1981).
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ment. 5" Nine permissible grounds for the eviction of tenants are delineated,
as well as the procedures by which a landlord52 may lawfully recover possession of rental property.5 3 Furthermore, the section mandates that "no tenant shall be evicted from a rental unit for any reason other than for
nonpayment of rent unless he or she has been served with a written notice to
vacate which meets the requirements of this section." 54 These eviction restrictions play an integral role in the District of Columbia rent control legislation, because "if the tenant remained subject to the landlord's power to
evict, the attempt to limit the landlord's demands would fail." 55

II.

TENANCIES AT WILL VS. TENANCIES UNDER THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA RENTAL HOUSING ACT: JUDICIAL RESOLUTION
OF AN APPARENT STATUTORY CONFLICT

A.

The Term "Tenant" is Not Consistently Defined Throughout the
District of Columbia Code

In 1950, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Surratt v. Real
Estate Exchange5 6 addressed for the first time the apparent statutory conflict
that currently exists between tenancies at will, as defined by D.C. Code section 45-222," 7 and the tenancies created by the D.C. Rental Housing Act.58
In Surratt, an action for possession of real estate was brought by the purchaser of property sold at a foreclosure sale against the defaulting mortgagor. 59 The mortgagor unsuccessfully argued that because he had become a
tenant at will of the purchaser upon foreclosure," he was entitled to the
eviction protections afforded to tenants by the District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act of 1940 (D.C. Rent Act of 1940).61
51.

D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1561(a) (1981) (current version at D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-

2551(a) (1986)).
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See supra note 6.
See supra note 26.
See supra note 51.
Block, 256 U.S. at 157-58.
76 A.2d 587 (D.C. 1950).
See supra note 22.
Surratt, 76 A.2d at 587-88. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-2503(36) (1986) (replacing

D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1503(30)).

59. 76 A.2d at 587.
60. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-822 (1940) (currently codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 45222 (1986)); see also supra note 22 for the full text of'the statute.
61. 76 A.2d at 587-88. See District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act, D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 45-1605(b) (Supp. IV 1940). The eviction restrictions evaluated by the Surratt court were
substantially the same as those currently in effect. The section stated that "no action or proceeding to recover possession of housing accommodations shall be maintainable by any landlord against any tenant, notwithstanding that the tenant has no lease or that his lease has
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In rejecting this argument, the Surratt court first noted that according to
District of Columbia law, it was unlawful for a defaulting mortgagor to detain possession of property following foreclosure proceedings. 62 The tenancy at will created by section 45-222 was not intended to shield defaulting
mortgagors from eviction. Instead, it only served to afford notice of impending eviction to those in unlawful possession.6 3 Furthermore, the section's
proviso reflected the fact that this "tenancy" is not premised upon a contractual relationship. 6'
In contrast, the court noted that a tenancy within the meaning of the D.C.
Rent Act of 1940 served to regulate the eviction of those who were renting
property. Because the defaulting mortgagor had never paid rent under a
traditional landlord/tenant relationship, the court concluded that he was not
a tenant within the meaning of the 1940 Act. 65 Therefore, the Surratt decision indicated that the tenancies created by section 45-222 and the D.C.
Rent Act of 1940 are conceptually distinct.
In Simpson v. Spicer Real Estate, Inc., 66 a new owner of property following a foreclosure sale brought suit to evict the defaulting mortgagor. The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals awarded possession to the purchaser,
and held that a prior owner remaining in possession following foreclosure
proceedings was not protected by the District of Columbia statutory eviction
restrictions.6 7
The Simpson court clarified the two statutory definitions of "tenant" acknowledged in Surratt by stating that "[t]he distinction here is between a
tenant at common law--one who holds or possesses lands by any kind of
right or title-and a tenant under the renters' statute-one who stands in a
contractual relationship with his landlord."6 8 The court's rigid distinction is
misleading when taken out of context, as it implies that the status of a tenancy is subject to change upon the expiration of a lease or a transfer of title.
expired, so long as the tenant continues to pay the rent to which the landlord is entitled ...
The section then enumerated five permissible grounds for eviction.
62. 76 A.2d at 588. The court was referring to the District of Columbia forcible entry and
detainer statute, D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-735 (1940) (currently codified, in part, at D.C. CODE

ANN. §§ 16-1501 to -1505 (1981)); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3101 (1981). For a history
of the District of Columbia unlawful detainer statute and its relationship to § 45-222, see notes
27-43 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.

65. 76 A.2d at 588. See D.C. Emergency Rent Act, D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1611(f)
(Supp. IV 1940) (repealed 1953) (defining tenant as "a subtenant, lessee, sublessee, or other
person entitled to the use or occupancy of any housing accommodations").
66. 396 A.2d 212 (D.C. 1978).

67. Id. at 215.
68. Id. at 214.
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However, in context with the entire decision, the Simpson distinction indicates that a tenancy is characterized by the manner in which the inhabitant
initially obtained occupancy of the property.69 In other words, a "tenancy
arising from mere possession is not that which is referred to in the rent control statute," and a tenancy arising from the contractual landlord/tenant
relationship is protected by the D.C. Rental Housing Act, as long as the
occupant continues to pay rent.7 ° This interpretation of the Simpson distinction is directly supported by the words of the D.C. Rental Housing Act,
which state that "no tenant shall be evicted from a rental unit, notwithstanding the expiration of his or her lease or rental agreement, so long as he or she
continues to pay the rent to which the landlord is entitled for such rental
unit."7 1 Furthermore, if the status of a tenancy under the D.C. Rental
Housing Act changed to a tenancy at will upon foreclosure, the Surratt
court's distinction between the tenants of a defaulting mortgagor and the
mortgagor himself would be obscured, and "it is obvious ...

relationships are

that the two

different."7 2

B. PriorStatutory Conflicts With Rent Acts Have Been Construed
To Protect Renters
The first rent control act in the District of Columbia was declared constitutional by the United States Supreme Court shortly after World War V'
Since that time, the courts of both the District of Columbia and other jurisdictions have consistently upheld rent and eviction regulations to protect
74
tenants in possession of rental housing.
69. See id. at 214-15. The courts of various jurisdictions are in accord. For example, in
construing rent control legislation similar to the D.C. Rental Housing Act, the California
Supreme Court stated that "[i]f the occupant originally took lawful possession of the premises
as a tenant, he remains such for the purpose of the Rent Regulation no matter what change in
ownership occurs and regardless of whether under local law he is technically a 'tenant.' "
Lovett v. Bell, 30 Cal. 2d 8, 13, 180 P.2d 335, 338 (1947). Accord United Institutional Servicing Corp. v. Santiago, 63 Misc. 2d 935, 310 N.Y.S.2d 733 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970).

70. Simpson, 396 A.2d at 215. The Simpson court was construing the D.C. Rental Accommodations Act of 1975, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-1631 to -1674 (Supp. V 1978), a predecessor to the D.C. Rental Housing Act of 1980.
71. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1561(a) (1981).
72. 76 A.2d at 588.
73. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921). See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 75-83 and accompanying text. Accord Lovett v. Bell, 30 Cal. 2d 8, 14,
180 P.2d 335, 339 (1947) (stating that the national rent and eviction law superseded state
statutes that were inconsistent with its purpose of protecting renters); United Institutional
Servicing Corp. v. Santiago, 62 Misc. 2d 935, 310 N.Y.S.2d 733 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970) (requiring compliance with statutory eviction restrictions before a purchaser of rental property following a foreclosure sale could evict existing tenants).
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In Myers v. H.L. Rust Co.,75 a tenant in possession of rental property was
given eviction protection under the existing rent act despite the existence of
conflicting legislation.7 6 The court stated that to the extent of the conflict,
the earlier law must yield to the major purpose of the rent act. Similarly, in
Jack Spicer Real Estate v. Gassaway,7 7 the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals applied the eviction procedures of a successor rent control statute to
tenants at sufferance despite earlier conflicting statutory provisions. 78 The
earlier provisions of the D.C. Code stated that tenancies at sufferance could
be terminated by a thirty day notice to quit. 79 Relying in part upon the
Myers decision, the court held that the earlier legislation was superseded by
the District of Columbia Rent Control Act of 1973.80 This holding was later
clarified to indicate that the rent control statute did not automatically supplant the conflicting legislation. Instead, the two statutes were to be construed harmoniously to protect tenants in possession of rental property. 8
D.C. Code section 45-1403 states that a tenancy at will may be terminated
by thirty days notice in writing. 2 In the Valentine decision, the District of
Columbia judiciary addressed for the first time the question of whether the
tenant of a defaulting mortgagor could be evicted as a tenant at will following a foreclosure sale or whether the provisions of the D.C. Rental Housing
Act applied. However, prior to the court's holding in Valentine that the
Act's eviction restrictions survive foreclosure, the D.C. Rental Housing
Commission had already reached the same conclusion using a different
rationale.8 3
75. 134 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1943).

76. Id. The Myers court afforded the tenant eviction protection under the D.C. Emergency Rent Act, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-1601 to -1611 (Supp. IV 1940) (repealed 1953) after

her lease had expired, despite the contrary terms of D.C. CODE ANN. § 15-201 (1940) describing an issuance of execution.
77. 353 A.2d 288 (D.C. 1976).

78. Id. The Gassaway court held that a landlord must comply with the eviction restrictions enumerated in the D.C. Rent Control Act of 1973, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-1621 to -1627
(Supp. 1974) (repealed 1975) in an attempt to regain possession of rental housing from a tenant

at sufferance. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-820 (1973) (currently codified at D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 45-220 (1986)).

A tenancy at sufferance is created if a tenant possesses property and pays

rent without a lease or when a tenant remains in possession after the lease expires. Id.
79. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-904 (1973) (currently codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1404
(1986)).

80. Gassaway, 353 A.2d at 291-92.
81. See Jones v. Brawner, 435 A.2d 54, 56 (D.C. 1981) (explaining that the Gassaway

court intended District of Columbia rent control legislation to supplement, not replace, the
statute defining tenancies at sufferance); see also Myers v. H.L. Rust Co., 134 F.2d 417, 419
(D.C. Cir. 1943) (stating that to the extent of the conflict, earlier legislation should be interpreted so as not to defeat the rent act's major purpose).
82. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1403 (1986).
83. Ficke v. Wash. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, TP 11,062/NV 14,621 (D.C. Rental Hous-
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OF VETERANS AFFAIRS V. VALENTINE:

STATUTORY EVICTION PROTECTION FOR THE TENANTS OF
A DEFAULTING MORTGAGOR

In Administratorof Veterans Affairs v. Valentine,8 4 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals applied the District of Columbia statutory eviction
restrictions to a defaulting mortgagor's tenants who remained in possession
of rental property following a foreclosure sale.8" The Valentine decision
presented a logical application of relevant legislative and judicial findings.
A.

The District of Columbia Rental Housing Act's Eviction Protections
Are Not Dependent Upon The Continued Existence Of A
ContractualLandlord/Tenant Relationship

In Valentine, the VA focused upon its lack of a contractual relationship

with Valentine and unsuccessfully relied upon the Simpson distinction to assert that a tenancy under the D.C. Rental Housing Act could not exist in the
absence of a contractual landlord/tenant relationship.86 The Valentine court
ing Comm'n 1984). In Ficke, the Commission relied upon D.C. Code § 45-1661 to resolve the
apparent conflict between § 45-222 and the D.C. Rental Housing Act. Id. See D.C. CODE
ANN. § 45-1661 (1986). Section 45-1661 provides, in part, that any statutory ambiguity
should be resolved in favor of strengthening tenants' rights.
Section 45-1661 is part of the District of Columbia Rental Housing Conversion and Sale Act
of 1980 Amendments and Extension Act of 1983, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-1601 to -1663
(1986) (amending and extending the District of Columbia Rental Housing Conversion and
Sale Act of 1980, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-1601 to -1657 (1981)). Although this Act is related
to the D.C. Rental Housing Act of 1980, the two statutes constitute separate legislation. See
infra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.

The Ficke concurrence stated that the tenants were tenants at sufferance and were therefore
entitled to statutory eviction protection. Ficke at 3 (Marlin, Comm'r, concurring and dissenting) (citing Gassaway, 353 A.2d at 289-90).
84. 490 A.2d 1165 (D.C. 1985).
85. Id. The court began by noting the deference it owed to the D.C. Rental Housing
Commission's ruling in Ficke that a mortgage foreclosure "does not deprive the mortgagor's
tenants of the protection of § 45-1561." 353 A.2d at 1167. Complaints and petitions arising
under the D.C. Rental Housing Act are heard and decided by the Rent Administrator. See
D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1515(c) (1981) (replaced by D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-2514(c) (1986)).
Appeals from these decisions are heard by the D.C. Rental Housing Commission, which is the
administrative agency responsible for the final interpretation and application of the District's
rent control laws. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1513(a)(2) (1981) (replaced by D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 45-2512(a)(2) (1986)). Therefore, "the agency's interpretation is controlling unless it is
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the statute." Valentine, 490 A.2d at 1167 (quoting Totz
v. D.C. Rental Accommodations Comm'n, 412 A.2d 44, 46 (D.C. 1980)).
86. 490 A.2d at 1168. Because § 45-222 does not distinguish between defaulting mortgagors and their tenants, the VA also unsuccessfully relied upon the Simpson holding to assert
that a defaulting mortgagor's tenants are not protected by the District of Columbia statutory
eviction restrictions. Id. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Simpson holding.
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refused to adopt a literal interpretation of its earlier distinction between a
tenant at will and a tenant protected by rent control legislation, 7 and found

that neither the words nor the purposes of the Act's eviction protections
required the existence of a contractual relationship between a tenant and a
subsequent purchaser of rental property following foreclosure. 88 In affording a defaulting mortgagor's tenants protection from eviction by a purchaser
of the rental property, the court held that "[s]ection 45-1561 evinces an in-

tent to protect from evictions persons who have been renting apartments and
who continue to pay the rent."8 9
The Valentine decision harmonized the Simpson court's distinction between a tenant at will and a tenant under the rent control statute with both
the words of the D.C. Rental Housing Act and prior court decisions. The
Simpson court was applying the statutory eviction protections to tenancies
arisingfrom a contractual landlord/tenant relationship rather than from

mere possession.9" The expiration of a contractual relationship or a transfer
of title was not relevant to the distinction between the two types of tenancies.9 1 Taken in this context, the Simpson holding is consistent with section
45-1561, which explicitly states that the expiration of a contractual relationship with a landlord does not deprive a tenant of the statutory eviction protections as long as "he or she continues to pay the rent to which the landlord
87. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
88. 490 A.2d at 1170. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1502 (1981) (replaced by D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 45-2502 (1986)) lists five statutory purposes for which the D.C. Rental Housing Act and the
§ 45-1561 eviction restrictions were enacted. These are:
(1) To protect low- and moderate-income tenants from the erosion of their income
from increased housing costs;
(2) To provide incentives for the construction of rental units and the rehabilitation
of vacant rental units in the District of Columbia;
(3) To improve the administrative machinery for the resolution of disputes and
controversies between landlords and tenants;
(4) To protect the existing supply of rental housing from conversion to other uses;
and
(5) To prevent the erosion of moderately priced rental housing while providing
landlords and developers with a reasonable rate of return on their investments.
See also supra note 86.
89. Valentine, 490 A.2d at 1170 (emphasis in original). Section 45-1561(a) states, in pertinent part, that
Except as provided in [§ 45-1561(b) to ()] no tenant shall be evicted from a rental
unit, notwithstanding the expiration of his or her lease or rental agreement, so long
as he or she continues to pay the rent to which the landlord is entitled for such rental
unit. No tenant shall be evicted from a rental unit for any reason other than for
nonpayment of rent unless he or she has been served with a written notice to vacate
which meets the requirements of this section.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1561(a) (1981) (replaced by D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-2551(a) (1986)).
90. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
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."' The Valentine holding preserves both the meaning of
*.".

these words and the Simpson distinction by protecting only those tenancies
originally premised upon a contractual agreement to pay rent.
B.

The District of Columbia Rental Housing Act's Definition Of Landlord
Includes A New Owner Of Rental Property Following A
ForeclosureSale

The D.C. Rental Housing Act of 1980 defines a "landlord" as "an owner,
lessor, sublessor, assignee, any agent thereof, or any other person receiving
or entitled to receive rents or benefits for the use or occupancy of any rental
unit within a housing accommodation ....

In addition to its contention

that Valentine was a statutory tenant at will following foreclosure, the VA
also relied upon the absence of a contractual relationship between Valentine
and itself to assert that it was not entitled to receive rent as required by the
Act's definition of a landlord. 94 Relying on the remedial purposes of section
45-1561, the court rejected this argument and held that the purchaser of
rental property at a foreclosure sale is entitled to receive rent from a defaulting mortgagor's tenants despite the absence of a contractual relationship. 95
In reaching this conclusion, the Valentine court noted that the D.C. Rental
92. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1561(a) (1981). See supra note 86.
93. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1503(12) (1981) (emphasis added). See supra note 6.
94. Valentine, 490 A.2d at 1168-69.
95. Id. at 1169-70. The majority stated that "in the context of the District's rent control
statutes, it seems apparent that, in a case such as this, [the phrase 'the rent to which the
landlord is entitled'] is intended to refer to the money payable for use and occupancy of the
particular unit after foreclosure." Id. at 1169.
The court's holding in Valentine appeared to reverse its two-year-old decision in Nicholas v.
Howard, 459 A.2d 1039 (D.C. 1983), which stated that a new owner of property was not
entitled to collect overdue rent from the former owner's tenant in the absence of a contractual
landlord/tenant relationship. Id. at 1040. However, a closer examination reveals that the two
holdings are not inconsistent. The Nicholas holding must be read in the context of its facts.
The new owner in Nicholas was attempting to collect rent arrearages from the evicted tenants
of the former owner. Id. The statute authorizing an award of rent arrearages states, in pertinent part, that "the landlord may join with his claim for recovery of the possession of the
leased premises a claim for all arrears of rent accrued to the termination of the tenancy ....
"
(emphasis supplied). D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1411 (1986). The new owner had previously
failed in his efforts to negotiate a new lease, and therefore a contractual landlord/tenant relationship did not exist between the parties. 459 A.2d at 1040. In addition, the parties admitted
to the absence of a contractual landlord/tenant relationship. Id. at 1041. Because the statute
authorizing an award of rent arrearages refers specifically to the "leased" premises, the court
held that the new owners were not entitled to a money judgment for past-due rent. Id. at 1040.
However, the Nicholas court held that the new owner was entitled to the reasonable worth of
the tenants' use and occupancy. Id.
The Nicholas decision did not involve the D.C. Rental Housing Act. Therefore, the court
relied upon the traditional definition of a landlord, which requires a contractual relationship to
exist before a property owner is entitled to receive rent from a tenant. Id. See also Valentine,
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Housing Act's definition of landlord is not premised upon "the technical
precepts of real property law." 96 This holding is supported by the words of
section 45-1561, which expressly state that the expiration of a lease or 97rental
agreement does not deprive tenants of the Act's eviction protections.
The Valentine majority's decision to apply the D.C. Rental Housing Act's
definition of landlord to a foreclosing mortgagee or subsequent purchaser
derived additional support from the Act's stated intent "to protect the exThis puristing supply of rental housing from conversion to other uses."
pose would be subverted if the subsequent owner of rental property could
automatically evict tenants for any reason following foreclosure proceedings.
The decision, however, neglected the stated legislative intent to provide incentive for the construction and rehabilitation of rental units. 99 Available
mortgage funding for the purchase of District of Columbia rental property
has decreased as a direct result of the Valentine decision."° The District of
Columbia judiciary can hardly be considered to have provided incentive for
the purchase and rehabilitation of District rental housing.
The Valentine holding is consistent with both the words and the remedial
nature of the D.C. Rental Housing Act. The majority weakened its decision,
however, by finding "no persuasive reason" to distinguish between a new
owner's relation to a defaulting mortgagor's tenants and a contractual landlord/tenant relationship.' 0 ' The VA's home mortgage insurance program
exemplifies one of the possible reasons for a distinction. This federal program is effected through the VA's Loan Guaranty Revolving Fund. 0 2 Upon
foreclosure, the VA is statutorily required to expedite its possession and sale
490 A.2d at 1169 (noting that in cases not involving rent control legislation, a landlord would
not be entitled to rent in the absence of a contractual agreement with a tenant).
96. 490 A.2d at 1170.
97. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1561(a) (1981).
98. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1502(4) (1981) (replaced by D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-2502(4)

(1986)). The majority's decision to include the VA within the D.C. Rental Housing Act's
definition of a landlord is further supported by previous decisions in both the District of Columbia and other jurisdictions. See Arsenault v. Aryle, 43 A.2d 709, 710 (D.C. 1945) (holding

that a new owner's suit for possession of rental property against the former owner's tenant was
proper because eviction was sought for a reason provided by the existing rent control statute);
accord Long Branch Banking Co. v. Howland, 133 N.J. Eq. 315, 32 A.2d 860 (1943) (stating
that the applicability of rent and eviction control legislation was not limited to technical land-

lord/tenant actions); but cf Guttenburg Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Rivera, 85 N.J. 617, 623, 428
A.2d, 1289, 1292 (1981) (holding a state anti-eviction statute applicable only to traditional
landlord/tenant relationships).
99. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1502(2) (1981) (replaced by D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-2502(2)

(1986)).
100. See Wash. Post, supra note 10, at BI, col. 3.
101. Valentine, 490 A.2d at 1170.
102. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1824 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985). See Rank v. Nimmo, 677 F.2d 692,
693 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982).
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of insured property in order to reimburse the fund. ° 3 Mandatory compliance with the District of Columbia statutory eviction restrictions interferes
with this process, as it restricts the VA's ability to acquire clear title to rental
housing. The result is a depression in property values'o' and an impediment
to the VA's ability to return money to its revolving fund. The Valentine
majority overlooked the fact that its decision would deplete the loan guarantee fund by forcing the VA to repair and maintain properties or maintaining
properties for rental tenants, "which could place the loan guarantee fund in
jeopardy and conceivably turn the VA into a rental agency, a function clearly
not intended by congress."' '°

IV.

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RENTAL HOUSING ACT SUPERSEDES
EARLIER CONFLICTING LEGISLATION

A.

District of Columbia Code Section 45-222 Is Not Implicitly Repealed
By The Statutory Eviction Restrictions

The Valentine majority's decision to afford a defaulting mortgagor's tenants statutory eviction protection caused the statutory definition of a tenancy
at will to be superseded by the terms of the D.C. Rental Housing Act.106
The dissent argued that section 45-222 was therefore implicitly repealed.'0 7
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Terry correctly asserted that repeals by im08
plication are contrary to established principles of statutory construction.
103. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1824 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985). "The policy of the VA housing
program 'is, broadly stated, to enable veterans to obtain loans and to obtain them with the
least risk of loss upon foreclosure, to both the veteran and the Veteran's Administration as
guarantor of the veteran's indebtedness .... ' " Rank, 677 F.2d at 693 (quoting United States
v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)). This congressional policy is effected through the VA's
loan guaranty mechanism. Id.
104. See Valentine, 490 A.2d at 1170 (admitting that compliance with the majority's decision results in the depression of property values).
105. Wells v. United States Adm'r of Veterans Affairs, 537 F. Supp. 473, 477 (E.D.N.Y.
1982). The Valentine court also ignored the potential effect of its decision on the availability of
federally insured mortgages. Under certain circumstances, the Federal Housing Administration's (F.H.A.) mortgage insurance program requires a lender to acquire rental property following foreclosure and convey it to the F.H.A. in a vacant condition. See 24 C.F.R. § 203.381
(1985). If compliance with statutory eviction restrictions renders this impossible, the F.H.A.
can refuse to pay the insurance proceeds. The result will be a reduction in available mortgage
funds. Furthermore, the Valentine decision creates a potential conflict with Congress' stated
intent "to provide a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family" through the federally insured mortgage. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (West 1979 & Supp.
1985); Guttenberg Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Rivera, 85 N.J. 617, 631-32, 428 A.2d 1289, 1297
(1981).
106. 490 A.2d at 1170.
107. Id. at 1171 (Terry, J., dissenting).
108. See United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939) ("Repeals by implication
are not favored. When there are two acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give effect to
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He also validly argued that sections 45-222 and 45-1561 are capable of coexistence despite an apparent conflict, and therefore, both laws should be given
effect rather than repealed.' 0 9 However, the dissent's argument that the
term "supersede" is synonymous with "repeal" is erroneous, and it obscures
a proper understanding of the majority's decision.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has previously explained that
the terms of an earlier statute superseded by rent control laws are not automatically repealed by the later legislation. "° Instead, the statutes are to be
construed harmoniously to provide additional protection for tenants in possession of rental property."' This is exactly what the Valentine majority did
in its decision to supersede section 45-222. However, the dissent focused on
the words of section 45-222 that define a defaulting mortgagor's tenants as
tenants at will subject to automatic eviction following a foreclosure sale, and
12
concluded that the statute had been repealed by the majority's decision."
The dissent failed to recognize that the majority actually upheld the purposes for which both statutes were originally enacted." 3
The Valentine majority upheld the purposes of both sections 45-222 and
45-1561 by requiring a new owner of rental property to comply with the
eviction restrictions following a foreclosure sale. The court applied the statutory eviction protections only to the tenants of a defaulting mortgagor, and
not to the mortgagor himself.'
In other words, the D.C. Rental Housing
Act modifies section 45-222 only to the extent that those tenancies arising
from a contractual relationship are no longer tenancies at will after foreclosure. '" Therefore, when rent control legislation is in effect, the tenants of a
defaulting mortgagor are no longer immediately subject to eviction following
foreclosure.
Although the definition of unlawful possession is limited by section 451561, any tenant in unlawful possession of property, as defined by the
Act,"' can still be summarily evicted by a subsequent purchaser. Furthermore, even if a suit for possession is based upon a valid statutory reason, the
both if possible."); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974) (stating that the judiciary
has a duty to harmonize potentially conflicting statutes in the absence of express congressional

intent to the contrary).
109. Valentine, 490 A.2d at 1171 (Terry, J., dissenting); see also supra note 108.
110. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 81 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 119-20.
112. Valentine, A.2d at 1170-71.

113.
114.
115.
tended

See supra notes 27-55, 88-89, and accompanying text.
490 A.2d at 1168.
Accord Myers, 134 F.2d 417, 419 (stating that the existing rent control act was into modify earlier conflicting legislation (emphasis added)).

116. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1561(b) to (j) (1981) (replaced by D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-

2551(b) to (i)
(1986)).
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terms of section 45-1561 provide the tenant with at least thirty days notice of
an impending eviction.117 Also, as the majority stated, the defaulting mort-

gagor is unprotected by section 45-1561 and remains a statutory tenant at
will subject to eviction following foreclosure proceedings."' 8 Therefore, because anyone in unlawful possession of property is still afforded notice of
impending eviction proceedings, the decision in Valentine did not judicially
repeal section 45-222. Instead, the majority upheld the section's purpose,
and harmonized it with that of the D.C. Rental Housing Act.
B. A Liberal Interpretation Of Section 45-1561 Is Consistent
With The Remedial Purpose Of The District of
Columbia Rental Housing Act

It is settled law that remedial legislation should be liberally construed in
order to effectuate its purposes"1 9 unless such a construction is absurd or
contrary to a statute's stated purpose.12 ° The D.C. Rental Housing Act and
its predecessors are considered by the judicial system to be remedial legislation.' 2 ' The eviction restrictions of section 45-1561 are central to the Act's
purpose of stabilizing the rental market.' 2 2 Therefore, the majority's decision to hold new owners of rental property in compliance with the restrictions is neither absurd nor contrary to the D.C. Rental Housing Act's
purposes.

The dissent argued that the City Council's failure to indicate expressly
117. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1561(c) (1981) (replaced by D.C. CODE ANN. § 452551(c) (1986)) (permitting eviction for a violation of the tenancy only after the landlord has
provided a thirty day notice to correct or vacate); D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1561(d) (replaced by
D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-2551(d) (1986)) (permitting an owner to recover possession of rental
property for personal use as a dwelling only after the tenant has received a 90 day notice to
vacate); D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1561(f) (replaced by D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-2551(f) (1986))
(requiring the tenant to receive a 120 day notice to vacate before a landlord may recover
possession for the purpose of making major renovations).
118. 490 A.2d at 1167-68. See also D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-222 (1986).
119. See McCree v. McCree, 464 A.2d 922 (D.C. 1983) (stating that a remedial statute
should be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose); Hutchinson Bros. Excavation Co. v.
District of Columbia, 278 A.2d 318 (D.C. 1971) (remedial statutes should be liberally interpreted, and any exception should be narrowly construed).
120. Gassaway, 353 A.2d at 291 (citing Maryland & District of Columbia Rifle & Pistol
Ass'n v. Washington, 442 F.2d 123, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
121. See, e.g., Gassaway, 353 A.2d at 291. The Gassaway court noted that the District of
Columbia City Council had been authorized by Congress "to adopt such rules as it determines
necessary and appropriate to regulate and stabilize rents in the District of Columbia .... "
D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1622(a) (1975). See also Lovett, 30 Cal. 2d at 14, 180 P.2d at 339,
stating that "[a]s part of the over-all national program to preserve the economic security of the
country during the emergency period, the [Emergency Price Control Act] envisages, among
other things, the regulation of rentals and the control of the eviction of tenants ...
122. See supra notes 55, 88, and accompanying text.
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that rent control legislation would supersede section 45-222 indicated a legis123
lative intent to create an exception to the D.C. Rental Housing Act.
Judge Terry attempted to support this argument by referring to section 451661, which states that
The purposes of this chapter favor resolution of the ambiguity
by the hearing officer or a court toward the end of strengthening
the legal rights of tenants or tenant organizations to the maximum
extent permissible under law. If this chapter conflicts with another
provision of law124of general applicability, the provisions of this
chapter control.
Section 45-1661 refers to the District of Columbia Rental Housing Conversion and Sale Act of 1980 Amendments and Extension Act of 1983125 (D.C.
Rental Housing Conversion and Sale Act) rather than the D.C. Rental
Housing Act. The dissent construed the City Council's failure to include a
similar section in the D.C. Rental Housing Act as evidence that the legislature did not intend section 45-222 to be superseded. 126 This argument, while
plausible, is inconsistent with settled rules of statutory construction and
prior court decisions. 127 Furthermore, it ignores the fact that the two acts
are intrinsically related.
One of the purposes of the D.C. Rental Housing Conversion and Sale Act
is "to discourage the displacement of tenants through conversion or sale of
rental property ... .,,128 Section 45-1561(e) of the D.C. Rental Housing
Act, which permits an owner to lawfully evict tenants for the purpose of
selling the rental property, requires full compliance with the D.C. Rental
Housing Conversion and Sale Act. 129 If section 45-222 is construed as an
123. Valentine, 490 A.2d at 1172.
124. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1661 (1986).

125. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-1601 to -1663 (1986) (amending and extending the D.C.
Rental Housing Conversion and Sale Act of 1980, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-1601 to -1657
(1981)).
126. 490 A.2d at 1172.
127. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text; see also Gassaway, 353 A.2d at 291

(stating that the purpose behind rent control legislation, and not the express words of the
statute, should be used to evaluate Congress' intent to supersede conflicting laws); Myers, 134
F.2d at 419 (holding that a rent control statute's purpose indicated that Congress "obviously
intended" to supersede earlier conflicting legislation).
128. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1602(1) (1986). The D.C. Rental Housing Conversion and
Sale Act of 1980 constitutes another legislative enactment intended to protect individuals from
displacement and the loss of their homes. The Act regulates both the conversion of condominiums and cooperatives and the sale of rental housing. See Report of the Comm. on Housing
and Economic Dev., Bill 3-222, Rental Housing Conversion and Sale Act of 1980, May 13,
1980.
129. Section 45-1561(e) states, inter alia, that a landlord may recover possession of rental
property for the purpose of selling it "so long as, at the time the owner offers the rental unit...
for sale, the landlord has so notified the tenant in writing and extended to the tenant an oppor-
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exception to the eviction restrictions of section 45-1561, and the new owners
of rental property are permitted to evict automatically a defaulting mortgagor's tenants, the purposes of both rent acts would be undermined. A subsequent purchaser of rental property following a foreclosure sale would not
have to comply with the D.C. Rental Housing Act's eviction restrictions.
Therefore, compliance with the D.C. Rental Housing Conversion and Sale
Act would no longer be necessary when seeking to convert rental property to
other uses following foreclosure proceedings. This result would be contrary
to the terms of section 45-1661, which expressly permit the D.C. Rental
Housing Conversion and Sale Act to supersede conflicting legislation. 3 o
V.

CONCLUSION

In Administratorof Veterans Affairs v. Valentine, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals applied the District of Columbia statutory eviction restrictions to a new property owner's attempt to evict a defaulting mortgagor's
tenants following a foreclosure sale. By refusing to afford the same protection to the defaulting mortgagor, the court both clarified and upheld the
D.C. Rental Housing Act's purpose of stabilizing the District rental housing
market by protecting renters from arbitrary eviction. In addition, the Valentine court resolved an apparent statutory conflict between tenancies at will
and tenancies created by the D.C. Rental Housing Act of 1980 by explaining
that the term "tenant" is not consistently defined throughout District of Columbia law. The dissent's contention that the terms of section 45-222 are
implicitly repealed reflected a misunderstanding of the majority's decision.
The majority upheld the purpose of section 45-222 and harmonized it with
the D.C. Rental Housing Act.
Although the Valentine holding is consistent with both the plain language
and the remedial nature of the rent control law, it has had an adverse impact
on the availability of home mortgage loans in the District. The creation of
an exception to the eviction controls following a foreclosure sale, however,
would result in the displacement of renters in the absence of statutory safeguards, and such an outcome is contrary to both the words and the legislative purpose of the D.C. Rental Housing Act.
Kelley Ann Baione

tunity to purchase as provided in [the D.C. Rental Housing Conversion and Sale Act]." D.C.
CODE ANN. § 45-1561(e) (1981) (replaced by D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-2551(e) (1986)).
130. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1661 (1986).

